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Abstract
This study analyses the possible existence of spatial non-price competition in the
port industry. We propose a dynamic two-stage model that allows: (1) to estimate the
sensitivity of generation and diversion of tra¢ c caused by port capacity expansions; (2)
to quantify the degree of capacity competition; (3) to simulate a hypothetical scenario
of cooperation agreements among di¤erent port authorities. The econometric speci-
cation is based on a structural model of demand, cost and market equilibrium. The
empirical results suggest that non-price competition exists in port infrastructure ser-
vices. Furthermore, using a simulation analysis, we show that incentives to invest in
port capacity decrease under a cooperative setting.
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper is concerned with two important aspects of the strategic behavior of rms.
Firstly, the e¤ect of informational externalities of conduct on the strategic interdependence
among rms. For instance, when agents make decisions, they take into account their ex-
pectations about the response of the rest of agents (strategic interdependence). These
expectations are based on the own experience and/or on the information available at that
moment. Therefore, informational externalities of conduct occur when the available in-
formation about agentsbehavior a¤ects strategies of the others. Secondly, the e¤ect of
non-price strategies on rmsdemand. In this way, pricing has been considered the main
competitive strategy of rms. However, the existence of close substitutes or public pricing
regulation might make non-price strategies relevant to increase their demand and compete
among them.
We illustrate the method with an application to the port industry in Spain. Histori-
cally, port regulation in Spain has allowed to port authorities to plan their infrastructure
investments under the supervision of the national port agency Puertos del Estado. As a
consequence, they have adopted capacity expansion strategies in order to become more at-
tractive to current and potential clients, and so to attract additional cargo tra¢ c. In fact,
during the period analyzed (1992-2011) Spanish port authorities carried out substantial
investments in capacity, which required a great amount of nancial resources.
The methodology proposed allow to measure the e¤ect of port capacity expansion, con-
sidered as a non-price strategy, on port demand, under a spatial di¤erentiation setting
in the industry. In particular, the sensitivity of both cargo tra¢ c generated and tra¢ c
diverted due to port capacity expansion is estimated. Additionally, our empirical especi-
cation allows to evaluate the level of capacity competition. This means that it is possible to
determine whether port authorities take into account the information available regarding
the other authoritiescapacities when they take their capacity decisions. Then we present
a structural model of demand, cost, and market equilibrium. We use panel data related
to nancial and tra¢ c information of Spanish port authorities to estimate the demand of
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cargo, a cost function system and a rst order equilibrium condition. Until the best of our
knowledge, there are not previous studies that analyze jointly the e¤ects of informational
externalities and non-price strategies in the port industry. Finally, in spite of our model has
been applied to the Spanish port system, the proposed methodology makes it possible to
estimate the e¤ect of port regulation and imperfect competition in an industry with spatial
di¤erentiation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we set the stage by describing
the structure and the regulation of the Spanish port industry. This is followed by a litera-
ture review about strategic interdependence in port industry and inter-port competition in
Section 3. Section 4 develops our theoretical model, while Section 5 shows the econometric
specication. In Section 6, the panel data used is described. Section 7 presents a discussion
of the results. Finally, Section 8 o¤ers concluding remarks and policy implications.
2. THE SPANISH PORT INDUSTRY
2.1. Regulation of the Spanish port system
In the early 90s, some relevant events, such us port privatization processes, the growth
of maritime freight or the implementation of the European Single Market, showed that a
new regulatory framework was necessary for the Spanish port industry in order to achieve
a greater agility and exibility to adapt to those changes and challenges. Then, the Act
27/1992 took into force with the aim of endowing Spanish ports with the tools to cope
with these new challenges. This reform was considered as the beginning of the Spanish port
devolution process.
Act 27/1992 followed those general principles of port management autonomy regading
to the inter-port competition and the fact that port charges were linked to actual costs.
Moreover, the Spanish port authorities and a central agency called Puertos del Estado
(State Ports) were created in order to begin the liberalization process of port services with
the introduction of private participation through a landlord port management system.
Port authorities were constituted as state-owned entities with legal personality, autonomous
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management and owing their assets. They must carry out their activity according to busi-
ness rules and procedures. In turn, the state-owned central agency Puertos del Estado
(State Ports) assumed global responsibility for the entire port system given that is set up
in order to control and coordinate port authorities.
Finally, Act 27/1992 designed port charges for port services as private prices which were
set by the central agency Puertos del Estado. These charges were identical for all port
authorities. However, some correction coe¢ cients in port charges were allowed within max-
imum and minimum boundaries in order to promote exibility. As a result of this strong
regulation, price competition was strongly limited. This pricing policy was justied in or-
der to achieve self-nancing for the whole port industry and to prevent of potential abusive
practices regarding the captive tra¢ c. Regarding investment decisions, port authorities
were responsible for planning and justifying their investments as well as carrying out the
corresponding complementary studies according to their tra¢ c forecasts. Then, Puertos del
Estado had to approve such investment plans.
Subsequently, the Act 62/1997, which modies Act 27/1992, delved into the functional
autonomy and management authorities. It also established policy measures to increase the
intensity of participation of regional governments in the structure of authority in order to
integrate more e¤ectively the economic and territorial interests of regions. In addition,
Act 62/1997 encouraged further private participation in the provision of port services and
specied the achievement of self-nancing for individual port authorities instead of the
overall system. This reform aimed to endow port authorities to set their basic port charges
with no limits. However, the 3rd Transitory Regulation of Act 1997 states that the Ministry
of Public Works and Transport established the maximum and minimum boundaries for
charges during the three years after coming into force Act 62/1997. Price competition
among port authorities was restricted again.
After a decade since the adoption of the Act of 92, new developments and new economic
realities justied legislative renewal with Act 48/2003. During this decade, there had been a
signicant growth in demand accompanied by an increment of inter-port competition -both
national and international- and intra-port competition -among di¤erent providers of port
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services in a port-. In this environment, the new law set as main objectives: enhancing the
competitive position of Spanish ports guaranteeing the principles of free competition; setting
criteria about protability and e¢ ciency in exploiting the public port space; promoting
participation of private companies in funding, construction and operation of port facilities
jointly with the provision of port services; enhancing the quality and e¤ectiveness of port
services; and reducing the cost of passage of goods by the ports. Besides, this law goes
a step beyond the target of self-nancing and cost coverage by transferring them to users
based in the recovery of operating costs, external costs and the costs of new investments.
So, operational and investment expenditures must be covered by current incomes, European
Union subsidies and external debt (Núñez-Sánchez, 2013). In Act 48/2003 any mention to
the freedom of prices for port authorities was deleted. Minimum and maximum boundaries
for the di¤erent charges were remained. However, with this reform these boundaries were
determined by alternative technical, market criteria and the capacity of getting prots of
port authorities. Finally, the last port regulatory reform took place in 2010. Act 33/2010
established wider correction coe¢ cients in order to increase inter-port competition.
In summary, three features have characterized our period of study. Firstly, the evolution
of self-nancing objective from the self-nancing for the overall system to the achievement
of a minimum protability objective for each individual port authority. Secondly, the strong
regulation about setting port charges which weakens e¤ective price inter-port competition.
Thirdly, a higher autonomy to plan their infrastructure investments which encourages non-
price competition among port authorities.
2.2. Investment in Spanish port industry
As we have mentioned in the previous section, port authorities have historically had a
greater autonomy in planning their investments because of the strong port price regulation.
This have led them to involve a great amount of nancial resources in order to improve and
extend their port infrastructure.
From 1992 to 2008, the aggregate port investment surpased 118,718 million euros, rising
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Fig. 1: Port investment distribution (1992-2008)
from 354 million euros in 1992 to 998 million euros in 2008. This investment process has
endowed the Spanish port system with modern facilities, such as docks or storage areas.
From 2002 until 2008 is considered the period of highest investment e¤orts. For instance,
the expansion of Spanish port capacity for 4,131 million euros, which represented 76 percent
of total investment in infrastructure and capacity. These facts led to Spanish port industry
to duplicate its storage area from 17 million of square meters in 2002 to 32 million in 2008.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the aggregate port investment.
However, growth of port infrastructure investment has been higher than cargo movement,
which has produced the existence of overcapacity in the system (Hidalgo-Gallego et al.
2015). Figure 2 shows both port investment and cargo tra¢ c trends during the period of
study. From 2002 to 2008, port investment went o¤, growing faster than tra¢ c. However,
when the global economic and nancial crisis began in 2008, port investment dropped to
similar levels to those of early 90s. This fact might be explained by two di¤erentes factors:
the reduction of public spending, on the one hand,and the notion that port supply does not
necessarily create port demand (González-Laxe, 2012), on the other hand.
In this context, two questions arise. Firstly, which factors have boost the investment
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Fig. 2: Port investment and cargo tra¢ c trends (1992-2012)
process experimented by Spanish port authorities? Literature identies numerous factors
that could lead port authorities to invest or over-invest, mainly in capacity. Haralambides
(2002) identies political issues related with the conception of ports as tools of regional
development; technological issues, as capital indivisibilities, economies of scale in port con-
struction, the increase in the size of vessels; or planning issues, as the over-optimistic demand
forecasts as reasons for over-investment. Luo et al. (2012) consider that port authorities
could be interested in having overcapacity as strategy to gain credibility and e¤ectiveness
of preemptive measures. Specically for the Spanish port system, Castillo-Manzano and
Fageda (2014) nd that factors such as e¢ ciency, the stock of port capital, a specialization
in containerized cargo tra¢ c or the coincidence of the same political party in both central
and regional government in ports hinterland have e¤ect on port investment decisions. Fi-
nally, the implementation of the landlord model that has given to port authorities more
autonomy to plan their investments, the increase of intra and inter-port competition, the
conception of expanding capacity as a competitive strategy to attract more tra¢ c or the
coincidence with a period of economic boom may also explain that trend.
Secondly, what has been the impact of these investments on freight tra¢ c?. According
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Verhoe¤ (1981), García-Alonso and Martín-Bofarull (2007), the answer is that the e¤ect of
investments on tra¢ c is uncertain, i.e., improving port facilities do not guarantee that a
port can compete successfully with other ports.
2.3. Port charges in Spanish port industry
Table 1 shows the incomes corresponding to the di¤erent charges charged by Spanish
port authorities and the weight of each one. As we can see, this charges can be classied in
three groups: general services charges, specic services charges and rents for the use of the
public space. The rst one comprises those incomes related with services provided to vessel,
passengers, cargo, sport vessels or fresh shing and signaling. With the entry into force of
the Act 33/2010 a new fee related to the special use of transit zones has been added to this
group. More than 50% of the Spanish port system incomes come from this group. However,
over the years the importance of this group has decreased in favor of the rents for the use
of public space. The second group consists of those incomes from specic services such as
the use of cranes, storage areas or warehouses or the provision of energy supplies which
represent the lower weight in total incomes. Finally, the third group is related to the rents
obtained by the leasing of public space by port authorities to private rms characteristic
of the landlord model. The increase of the importance of these rents is explained by the
progressive implementation of the landlord model (Núñez-Sánchez, 2013).
3. RELATED LITERATURE
3.1. Strategic interdependence in the port industry
Game theory and industrial organization are very useful tools to analyze strategic inter-
dependence in port industry decisions. They have been widely used in order to determine
optimal levels of port capacity and seek the factors behind. But, to date, there are few stud-
ies that analyze explicitly the interdependence in setting port capacities (Hidalgo-Gallego
et al, 2016).
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Table 1: Spanish port authorities incomes (1992, 2002 and 2011)
1992 2002 2011
Thousand e % Thousand e % Thousand e %
Signaling     3; 152:465 0:47 7; 013:27 1:03
Vessels 128; 104:51 20:74 129; 872:12 19:27 137; 605:63 20:24
Cargo 235; 709:69 38:16 285; 746:29 42:40 193; 824:15 28:51
Passenger 80; 204:63 12:98 35; 137:82 5:21 49; 606:58 7:3
Fish 15; 699:66 2:54 9; 225:59 1:37 4; 847:23 0:71
Sport vessels 4; 394:11 0:71 461:99 0:70 6; 383:57 0:94
Use trans. zones         1; 444:53 0:21
General services 46; 411:26 75:13 467; 826:30 69:09 400; 724:99 58:33
Cranes 3; 547:83 5:74 8; 124:55 1:21    
Storage 1; 966:77 3:18 8; 773:59 1:30    
Energy supplies 1; 496:01 2:42 14; 272:05 2:12    
Other 1; 737:90 2:81 18; 302:45 2:72    
Specic services 8; 748:51 14:16 49; 472:65 7:34 89; 572:56 13:17
Land Rents 6; 611:07 10:70 156; 683:53 23:25 189; 633:93 27:89
*Constant euros 2001=100
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Authors as De Borger et al. (2008), Xiao et al. (2012) and Tan et al. (2013) have
developed models which determine theoretically the optimal level of port capacity. The rst
ones base their model in a two-stage competition game where in rst stage governments
decide the levels of port and hinterland infrastructure capacity in order to maximize the
welfare of their respective regions. In the second stage, port managers choose port charges in
order to maximize ports prots. On the other hand, Xiao et al. (2012) analyze the optimal
levels of port capacity and the optimal port charges for di¤erent forms of ownership by
applying a one-stage integrated model. Finally, Tan et al. (2013) analyze pricing, capacity
and localization decisions of an inland river port which competes with road transport for
their customers, spatially distributed. In none of these models capacity decisions are a¤ected
by the capacity decisions of competitors, but by factors such as ownership, port charges,
customerslocalization. . .
In contrast, the models developed by Luo et al. (2012) and Anderson et al. (2008) explic-
itly consider strategic interdependence in capacity decisions. These models allow to assess
whether ports should invest in capacity or not, taking into account investment decisions
of their competitors. Both consider that the amount of capacity expansion is exogenously
determined and is the same for both ports, being common knowledge. So, although these
models explain when a port have to enlarge its capacity, the strict assumptions imposed
do not allowed to measure the optimal capacity expansion as a function of rivals strate-
gies. To the best of our knowledge, these authors are the only ones in port literature that
consider explicitly strategic interdependence in setting non-price competition instruments
-capacities-, but in their models, the best responses to capacity changes are not functionally
derived.
3.2. Geographical scope for port competition
There is a vast literature related to the factors that a¤ect port selection and ports
competitiveness. This literature can be classied in two groups. In the rst one, we nd
those works that obtain the relative importance of those factors on the basis of surveys to
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shippers, carriers or shipper lines (Guy and Urly, 2006; Ng, 2006; Chang et al., 2008; Yue
et al., 2012). A common nding in these articles is that port location is a key factor in
port selection and port competitiveness. In the second group, the e¤ect of the potential
determinants of port selection on the probability of a port being chosen by shippers is
estimated. Among these works, the studies of Malchow and Kanafani (2004) and Tiwary et
al. (2003) are especially interesting for our analysis. Malchow and Kanafani (2003) analyze
port selection among US ports nding that inland distance between shipment origin and
port is the main determinant in port selection followed by oceanic distance between the
port facility and the shipment destination. These two variables are beyond control of port
manager and are related to the location. However, authors state that when ports are
geographically close, other di¤erent factors may inuence on shippers decisions. Then,
for neighbour ports variables under control of port managers (such as port investment,
marketing. . . ) can be used in order to compete and to increase their port demand. In the
same line, Tiwari et al. (2003) analyze the shippersport choice in China. They obtain that
distance between shippers and ports is an important determinant of port selection. In this
sense, if a shipper location is far away from a given port, it will probably switch to other
closer port. On the other hand, their ndings suggest that variables related to capacity
have a positive e¤ect on the probability of a port being chosen.
3.3. Structural models
The New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) approach o¤ers tools to estimate
strategic interdependence in capacity expansion by using conjectural parameters. Although
this methodology does not allow us to derive a functional form for this interdependence,
it allows us to obtain a measure when the model is applied to data. This methodology
has been widely used in bank industry, where banks explicitly consider their own network
and their expectations about rivalsbranch network when they take branch decisions (De
Pinho, 2000; Kim and Vale, 2001; Valverde and Guevara, 2009). These models allows banks
take into account its rivalsfuture reaction to its network extension and the e¤ects of such
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response on their demand or market shares (Kim and Vale, 2001). Our research adapts this
methodology to the behavioral characteristics and structure of Spanish infrastructure port
industry in order to estimate and evaluate non-price competition in these industry.
4. THEORETICAL MODEL
We propose a dynamic two-stage model which is solved by backward induction. In the
rst stage Spanish port authorities try to maximize their present and future cargo demand
ows by setting port capacities in a given period. In the second stage, shippers choose the
amount of cargo which pass for each port that minimizes their port generalized cost once
they observe port charges and port capacities.
4.1. Second stage: Demand for di¤erentiated port infrastructure services
In port literature coexists di¤erent approaches to obtain theoretically a port demand
function. The most common approach is applying the Hotelling model to port industry
(Czerny et al., 2014; Van Reeven, 2010; Kaselimi et al., 2011; Yu and Shan, 2013; etc).
Other approaches used in this literature are the use of reduce-form of demand functions
(De Borger et al., 2008, Zhang, 2008; Wan and Zhang, 2013) or a reciprocal dumping
model (Matshumura and Matsushima, 2012). In all of these approaches the aim of a port
customer is the minimization of its generalized cost. It comprises the monetary costs charged
by a given port, the congestion or delay costs and transport cost of the cargo between the
origin/destination point and the port facility.
In this study, we have followed the approach proposed by Pinkse et al. (2012) which
presents some advantages. This approach, unlike other models such as those proposed by
Hotelling (1929) or Salop (1979), allows that shippers might use more than one facility
sharing their cargo among di¤erent ports. Moreover, their demands do not have to be unit,
i.e., they could send di¤erent amounts of cargo to a given port.
Formally, suppose that there are n port authorities that supply horizontally di¤erentiated
port services. Port authorities and their respective port services are indexed by i = 1 ; : : : ;n.
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Their port services are measured as the amount of cargo handled, q = (q1 ; q2 ; : : : ; qn)
T :
These port services are supplied at the port charges t = (t1 ; t2 ; : : : ; tn)
T . Finally, each port
service presents a port capacity si .
On the other hand, there are k shippers who need to load/unload their cargo in a given
seafront of Spanish coast so they demand q , these shippers are indexed by k = 1 ; : : : ;K .
Each shipper is located at a point in the geographic space and, therefore, has a single cost
function. Adittionally, shippers take port charges and capacities as given.
We assume that the kth shipper wants to minimize its port generalized cost which includes:
total monetary cost of passing cargo throught a given port, where T = (T1; :::; Th)T is the
total unit cost of handling cargo in a given port in which port charges (t1 ; t2 ; : : : ; tn) are
included and which can be interpreted as the total monetary price of using a given port;
and cost of time that cargo is on port. We do not include other transport costs given that
we assume that shippersdemand is a captive to the nearest seafront, so these transport
costs are implicitly taking into account. Finally, the time cost of cargo in a port facility
depends on port capacity, so the port cost function of the kth shipper is:
Pk = P [T; f(s)] = P (T; s) (1)
where Pk is the port generalized cost of the kth shipper, T is the vector of port total
prices, f is the time cost and nally s is the vector of capacities.
Without loss of generality, by treating a collection of price taking shippers as a single price
taking cost minimizing unit (Bliss, 1975, Pinkse et al. 2002), the aggregate cost function
obtained is
P (T; s) =
X
k
Pk(T; s) (2)
We assume that the aggregate cost function presents a exible functional form as the
quadratic cost function, which is a second order approximation to an arbitrary cost function
that places no restriction on product substitution possibilities.
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P (T; s) = 0 + 
T
1 T + 
T
2 s+
1
2

T TB1T + T TB2s+ sTB3s

(3)
where P is the port generalized cost, T is the vector of port total prices, s is the vector
of capacities, 0 is the coe¢ cient associated to the constant term, 1 and 2 are n  1
vectors of the rst order coe¢ cients related to prices and capacities respectively and nally,
B1, B2 and B3 are n  n symmetric matrices which contains the second order parameters
of the quadratic cost function.
Applying the Shephards Lemma, we can obtain the optimal demand for each port service,
i.e, the demand for cargo handled services of each port authority.
qi =
@P (T; s)
@Ti
= 1i +
X
j
 
b1ijTj + b
2
ijsj

(4)
We observe that the amount of port services demanded (q) in the ith port authority
depends on their own port total price (Ti) and capacity (si) and the prices and capacities
of their competitors (T i and s i).
4.2. First stage: Port capacity expansion
From the second stage we know that the quantity of demanded handled services (qi)
faced by a port authority in a given period is function on its own total port charge (ti),
competitorstotal port charges (t i), own capacity (si) and competitorscapacity (s i):
qit = q(Tit; T it; sit; s it) (5)
The demand or port services is expected to decrease with the increasement in its own total
port price (@qit=@Tit < 0) and its rivalscapacity expansions (@qit=@s it < 0). Otherwise,
port authorities demand will rise with the increasement in its rivals total port charge
(@qit=@T it > 0) and its own capacity investments (@qit=@sit > 0).
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In this stage, we assume that port authorities set capacities1 in order to maximize cargo
tra¢ c ows subject to achieve some level of protability. So, we assume that maximization
target is subject to a positive prot. Thus, the principle of nancial self-su¢ ciency in the
context of the Spanish port sector described in Section 2 is included in our model. This
decision problem takes also into account the nature of public-owned facility, which tries to
maximize the development of the port activity instead of maximizing its prots.
Then, from demands obtained in the second stage (5), the decision problem of a port
authority can be described as follow:
maxsitMi0 =
P1
t=0 qit
s:t: titqit   Cit(w;qit)  0
(6)
where qit is the amount of cargo services provided by the ith authority in the period t ,
tit is the port charge for those services, Cit is the total cost and w is the vector of inputs
prices.
In addition, we assume that port authorities use a feedback strategy (Kim and Vale,
2001), i.e., at period t port authorities set capacities based in the information available at
that time. In this case, it is the rivals capacity in the previous period. So, the ith port
authority knows that its competitors will react to its current capacity in the next period and
this will a¤ect its future demand. Then, ports authorities take into account rivals reaction
e¤ects on future demand when they set their present capacity, expecting rivals to react with
a lag of one period. In this way, calculating the partial derivative of the objective function
with the respect to the port capacity and equaling it to zero, we obtain the following rst
order condition:
@Mi0
@sit
=
@qit
@sit
+
@qit+1
@s it+1
@s it+1
@sit
  

tit
@qit
@sit
  @Cit
@qit
@qit
@sit

= 0 (7)
1As we stated in section 2, Spanish port regulation makes port authorities have higher autonomy or
competence in planning their investments than in setting their port fees. Because of this regulatory context,
we choose port capacity and not port fees as their decision variable in the objective function.
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The terms @qit@sit and
@qit+1
@s it+1 reect the e¤ect of changes in its own and rivals capacity
on the ith port authoritys cargo demand,
@Cit
@qit
represents the marginal cost of port ith in
period t, while @s it+1@sit capture the conjectural variation (or conduct parameter). This last
term shows how port authorities react to their rival capacity strategies. Our model allows
to the conjectural parameter to take zero, negative and positive values. However, we do
not expect negative values of the conjectural parameter because of the port infrastructures
characteristics. A negative sign of the conjectural parameter would be interpreted as a
signal of misspecication. On the other hand, a conjectural parameter equal to zero implies
a Nash equilibrium, i.e., port authorities not take into account rivalsdecisions when they set
their capacities. Finally, positive values implies that competitors respond to increments of
capacity, increasing their own capacity. In this case, a value equal to one implies imitation
of the rivals strategy. So, we can distinguish two e¤ects of increasing capacity in given
period: a direct e¤ect on current demand represented by the derivative @qit@sit ; and an indirect
e¤ect on next period demand measure by @qit+1@s it+1
@s it+1
@sit
: Not taking into account this second
e¤ect could led to under/overestimate capacity e¤ects on demand.
5. EMPIRICAL SPECIFICATION
The empirical specication of the above model is formed by a non-linear system of two
equations jointly estimated: a cargo demand equation (5) and the rst order condition (7)
for the choice of capacity.
We assume that the cargo demand function is specied as a log-linear relationship:
ln qit = i + 1 lnTit + 2 lnT it + 3 ln sit + 4 ln s it +  t + 
2 (8)
where Tit is the ith port charge related for a given port, T it represents the average port
charge of ith authoritys competitors, sit and s it are own capacity and the average of
competitorscapacities, 1 and 2 are own and cross price elasticities, 3 and 4 are the
elasticity e¤ect of variations in own and competititorscapacity on port authorities cargo
handled services demand respectively and nally, a quadratic trend () has been added to
account for technological change.
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The derivatives of cargo demand with respect ro the capacities are:
@qit
@sit
=
@ ln qit
@ ln sit
qit
sit
= 3
qit
sit
(9)
@qit
@s it
=
@ ln qit
@ ln s it
qit
s it
= 4
qit
s it
(10)
In order to obtain the empirical specication for the rst-order condition, we rst substi-
tute previous derivatives (9) - (10) in equation 7 as we have seen in 11.
3
qit
sit
+ 4
qit+1
s it+1
@s it+1
@sit
  

tit3
qit
sit
  @Cit
@qit
3
qit
sit

= 0 (11)
We take out common factors (12) and we rearrange (13):
3
qit
sit
 
1    tit   C 0it+ 4 qit+1s it+1's = 0 (12)
qit
sit
=  
4'
s qit+1
s it+1
3 (1   (tit   C 0it))
(13)
Equation 13 represents the empirical specication of the rst-order condition, where 's is
the conjectural parameter, i.e., the expected comptititorsresponses to change in capacities,
 is the Lagranges multiplier from the positive prots constraint and C 0it is the marginal
cost of cargo. In order to estimate equation 13, the inclusion of an intercept which varies
across port authorties allows to collect inobserved heterogeneity of port authorities. Thus,
the resulting equation is:
qit
sit
=  
4'
s qit+1
s it+1
3 (1   (tit   C 0it))
+
i
3
(14)
Finally, to estimate the marginal cost of cargo, we specify a quadratic cost system formed
by the cost equation (15) and the input expenditure equations (16). All variables of the
system are deviated from their means.
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Cit = i + q(qit   q) + 12qq(qit   q)2 +
RX
r=1
r(writ   w)+
RX
r=1
RX
s=1
rs(writ   w)(wsit   w) +
RX
r=1
qr(qit   q)(writ   w)+
 t +
1
2
2
t +
RX
r=1
r (writ   w) t + q (qit   q) t + it
(15)
The input expenditures equations can be obtained by applying the Shephards Lemma
to the cost function.
Erit = writ
@Cit
@writ
= writ
"
r +
RX
s=1
rs(wsit   w) + qr(qit   q) + r t + vrit
#
(16)
where C is the total cost, q is the amount of output, wr is the price of variable input
r (r = 1; 2; 3), Er is the input r expenditure,  is a time trend that captures the possible
existence of non-neutral technical change.
Finally, i = 1; : : : ; N relates to the i   th authority and t relates to the time period .
Those variables which have a bar on the top correspond to the sample means.
6. DATA
The model is estimated with data from a sample of 21 Spanish port authorities over
the period 1992-2011. We do not include those authorities located in an island; Seville,
which is a river port and Ceuta and Melilla, which are just strategic ports on the north of
Africa. We remove them because we consider that these authorities, due to the described
characteristics, do not follow the same competitive patterns than the other ones. Hence,
the sample used consists of 420 observations.
The data is collected from the annual reports published by Puertos del Estado (several
years, a and b) which provides homogeneous information about the performance of Spanish
port authorities.
Firstly, for the estimation of the quadratic system (15)-(16) we use the following variables.
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First, the dependent variable in equation 15 (ctr) is the total cost calculated as the sum of
labour, capital and intermediate consumption costs. Second, the input prices are: labour
price (w1), variable capital price (w2) and intermediate consumption price (w3). Labour
price (w1) is dened as the ratio of annual labour expenses by total employees. Capital price
(w2) has been approximated by multiplying a building index price of public works (obtained
from the reports of Confederación Nacional de la Construcción, SEOPAN) by the sum of
long-term interest rate and the depreciation rate the ports property and equipment. The
depreciation rate is calculated as the annual depreciation expenditures of each port authority
over the total assets. Intermediate consumption price (w3) is dened as the ratio resulted
by dividing intermediate consumption expense by intermediate consumptions, measured in
physical units. And third, dependent variables in expense equations are labour (E1), capital
(E2) and intermediate consumption (E3) expenses.
Secondly, the estimation of the non linear system 8- 14 needs information about cargo
demand (q), own port total charge (Ti), competitorsport total charge (T i), own capacity
(si) and competitorscapacity (s i). On one hand, demand for cargo services (q) is proxied
using the cargo handled by port authorities, whereas capacity (s) is measured as the square
metres of storage area for cargo. On the other hand, regarding port total charge (T ) and
competitors variables (T i and s i), a detailed explanation about their construction is
needed.
Due to the information about total cost of passing a unit of cargo for a given port (port
total price, Ti and T i) is not available, it is approximated using port authoritiescharges
(tit and t it). In practice, it is observed that the variability of port charges and the total
port costs in a given port follows a quite similar pattern. Moreover, port charges are one
of the most relevant decision variables when shippers choose a given port (Trujillo and
Nombela, 2000). Then, it is expected that they have a relevant e¤ect on port demand.
With this pricing structure mentioned in Section 2.3., the main charges that a¤ect cargo
tra¢ c are those related with vessels and cargo. So we combine them to approximate the
cost of a ton of cargo passing for a given port. Specically, tit and t it are built as the sum
of the incomes per ton from cargo and vessels services.
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In order to set the geographical scope of inter-port competition we have reviewed the
literature related.to this topic. This literature is scarce and it is formed by a few studies
about port hinterlands and port selection. The main contributions for the Spanish context
are García-Alonso and Sanchez-Soriano (2009) and Villaverde and Maza (2015). The results
of these works are in line with those from other countries and they can be summarizing as
follow. (1) Distance plays an important role in the port selection process, being the main
determinant of the hinterland follow by the attractiveness of the port. (2) The relation
between distance and port tra¢ c is not linear, since there is a limit beyond which the rela-
tionship between these variables is null. For the Spanish context is about 200 kilometers2.
(3) The area of inuence of each port is formed by the geographical environment of the
province in which the port is located and Madrid, which is part of the hinterland of all of
them. (4) Regions tend to be linked to the nearest port and this trend has not changed
over the years.
Finally, according to the literature reviewed, data on competitorsfees and capacities are
computed taking into account the spatial aspect of port competition. Due to its characteris-
tics, the intensity of competition may be stronger and better locally identied among those
port authorities that are closely located. In this sense, we have dened ve seafronts (Figure
3). (1) Galicia: which comprises port authorities of A Coruña, Ferrol, Villagarcía, Marín
y Ría de Pontevedra and Vigo. (2) North: formed by port authorities of Avilés, Gijón,
Santander, Bilbao and Pasajes. (3) Catalonia: which includes Barcelona and Tarragona
port authorities. (4) East : formed by port authorities of Castellón, Valencia, Alicante and
Cartagena. (5) South, which integrates port authorities of Almería-Motril, Málaga, Cádiz,
Bahía de Algeciras and Huelva.
Thus, if a given port authority i is located in a given seafront that integrates n port
authorities, is demand depend on n fees and n capacities (its owns and its rivals), which
implies at least 2n + 1 (intercept) parameters to be estimated. In order to reduce the
dimensions of the problem, instead of including the competitors n   1 fees and n   1
2This means that it is very di¢ cult to attract cargo tra¢ cs when the distance between port and origin
/ destination region is longer than 200 kilometers.
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Fig. 3: Seafronts at the Spanish port industry.
capacities, we replace them by their means3.
Finally, table 2 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables included in the model. All
economic variables have been deacted and are expressed in constant euros of 2001.
7. ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
The procedure of estimation is as follow: rst, the quadratic cost system 15 and 16 is
estimated by using a three stage least squares (3SLS) model and applying a xed e¤ects
estimator, in order to collect the existing heterogeneity among port authorities. Due to
3This approximation is based in spatial econometric techniques. A common specication for the spatial
weights in this methodology is the use of contiguity weights, where all agents/jurisdictions that are contiguous
geographic neighbors to a particular agent/jurisdiction are weighted equally (Cohen, 2010).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Units Standard deviation Min. Max
q 1:44E + 07 Ton 1:47E + 07 515442 7:72E + 07
ti 1:41 Constant Euros 2001 0:74 0:27 3:99
t i 1:40 Constant Euros 2001 0:51 0:64 2:99
si 849; 199:3 Squared-meters 958190:4 60395 4824550
s i 852; 641:5 Squared-meters 716849:4 143046 4824550
ctr 1:99E + 07 Constant Euros 2001 1:56E + 07 2768417 9:39E + 07
w1 31278:69 Constant Euros 2001 5922:206 14166:57 57664:24
w2 5:87 Constant Euros 2001 2:24 1:38 16:46
w3 43:14 Constant Euros 2001 31:50 2:45 215:76
E1 6; 819; 902 Constant Euros 2001 4731022 1449932 2:73E + 07
E2 7; 988; 428 Constant Euros 2001 6529388 779807:3 3:62E + 07
E3 5; 054; 906 Constant Euros 2001 4969310 353238:3 3:64E + 07
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the endogeneity of the cargo4 (q), we instrument it using a one-period lag of the variable5.
Additionally, variables from the cost system have been transformed in order to correct the
serial correlation. In this sense, we have applied the Cochrane and Orcutt (1949) trans-
formation. This approach has been applied before in cost system estimations by Sung and
Gorth (2000) and Botasso and Conti (2012). The parameters obtained in this rst estima-
tion are used to calculate the marginal cost of cargo services. Secondly, we estimate jointly
the demand equation (8) with the rst order condition equation (14), where the estimated
marginal costs in the rst stage are included as a regressor. In this case, we use a non-linear
three-stage least squares estimator (N3SLS) which applies the Gauss-Newton algorithm.
Starting values have been obtained from the estimation of the equations separately. Para-
meter standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. Again we use instruments in order
to correct the endogeneity of capacity6.
Table 3 displays the results of the quadratic cost system estimation, and table 4 shows
the port authoritiesaverage marginal costs for the studied period. The estimated para-
meters present the expected signs. The mean of the marginal cost of cargo across the 420
observations is 0.268 with a standard deviation of 0.194. In the period covered, for all ob-
servations, the average cost lie above marginal cost, so Spanish port authorities operate in
a region of scale economies. Specically, the economies of size in the mean of the sample are
4According to the assumptions of our model, port authorities port have some power to decide on the
production level through port capacities. So cargo is considered as endogenous variable in our model.
5One period lag of cargo tra¢ cs is used as instrument because of: rstly, there is a strong correlation
between the endogenous variable and its instrument; secondly, total cost in one period depend on the ows
of cargo of that period, but not on previous one, so it is very di¢ cult that a correlation between the errors
term in the equations of the system and the instrument exists.
6As we explained in section 2, capacity decisions could be inuenced by factors which di¤er from increasing
demand. This fact could cause endogeneity problems. We carried out a Haussman test to check if capacity is
actually a endogenous variable, not being able to reject the nule hiphotesis of endogeneity. In order to obtaint
consistent estimators, we use the one period lag of the own variable as instrument. On one hand, there is
a strong correlation between both variables. On the other hand, according to our model, when shippers
choose a given port, they take into account present prices and capacities, not previous ones. So there should
be no correlation between the one period lagged capacity and the error term in demand equation.
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equal to 0.182. This nding suggest that capturing new tra¢ cs has a double attractiveness:
rst, it increases revenues and second, reduce average costs taking advantage of those scale
economies.
We now use the estimates of marginal costs from previous to estimate the nonlinear system
formed by the rst-order condition (14) and the demand equation (8). In both equations,
we allow the existence of di¤erent intercepts for all authorities in order to control time
invariant heterogeneity among them. This individual dummies have not been display in
order to simplify the presentation of the results. As we can see in table 5, three di¤erent
estimations are carried out to test the robustness of the model. In the rst specication
we do not include technical change, in the second one we include a lineal trend and nally,
we include a quadratic trend in the third specication. The estimated coe¢ cients in the
di¤erent specications are very similar.
In the demand equation the coe¢ cients of lti and lt i, which represent price elasticity
and cross price elasticity, have the expected signs, positive and negative respectively, being
both signicant at 1% level. We nd that price elasticity is unitary since the coe¢ cient
associated is statistically equal to 1 in all of the specications. The cross-price elasticity is
always smaller than the absolute own-price elasticity, thus cargo demand is more sensitive to
variations in the own price rather than rivals. The elasticities associated to the capacities
have the expected sign and both are signicant at 1% level. The own capacity elasticity
is positive, it means that shippers respond positively to increases of capacity. On the
other hand, increases in rivalscapacities decreases the demand of a given port. This fact is
represented by the negative sign of cross-capacity elasticity. This result shows, as our model
explains in section 4, that shippers not only take into account the monetary costs of moving
their cargo but also non monetary cost, such as time cost, which depends on capacity since
the more capacity the less probability of su¤ering congestion problems (Basso and Zhang,
2006; De Borger and Van Dender, 2006).
The joint signicance F test does not allow to reject the null hypothesis. Then, the
parameters associated to the quadratic trend in specication 3 are jointly equal to zero. As
a consequence, we focus on the specication 1.
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Table 3: Cuadratic cost system estimation
Parameter Coe¢ cient Parameter Coe¢ cient
Constant 9294310
(8:5)
w1w3 0:00003

(1:88)
w1 192:71

(32:01)
w2w3 0:45

(3:4)
w2 796973:9

(15:04)
w1q 0:000009

(13:01)
w3 6:28

(13:93)
w2q 0:04

(7:3)
q 0:26
(3:27)
w3q 0:00000005

(0:43)
trend  60704:28
( 0:81)
trend2 45848:67
(1:06)
w1
2  0:002
( 2:53)
w1trend  12:97
( 6:05)
w2
2  4:013:05
( 0:31)
w2trend  118208
( 5:5)
w3
2 0
( 1:01)
w3trend  0:59
( 5:12)
q2 0
(0:09)
qtrend 0:03
(2:23)
w1w2 12:51

(5:35)
Individual
dummies
Included
R2 Cost eq. 0:84 E2 eq. 0:46
Standard dev. 2857432 3497413
R2 E1 eq. 0:79 E3 eq. 0:40
Standard dev. 1601477 2673459
Number of observations 441
t-statistics for the parameter estimates in parenthesis ( = signicant
at 1% level;  = signicant at 5% level; = signicant at 10% level)
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Table 4: Port authoritiesaverage marginal cost (1992-2012)
Port authority Marginal cost Condence intervals
Algeciras 0:23 0:18 0:27
Alicante 0:33 0:24 0:42
Almería 0:24 0:20 0:28
Avilés 0:28 0:22 0:33
Cádiz 0:25 0:20 0:30
Barcelona 0:30 0:26 0:35
Bilbao 0:39 0:34 0:43
Cartagena 0:26 0:21 0:31
Castellón 0:31 0:25 0:37
Ferrol 0:31 0:23 0:38
Gijón 0:30 0:25 0:36
Huelva 0:33 0:26 0:41
A Coruña 0:23 0:19 0:28
Málaga 0:25 0:20 0:30
Pasajes 0:33 0:28 0:39
Pontevedra 0:23 0:18 0:28
Santander 0:34 0:25 0:43
Tarragona 0:27 0:22 0:31
Valencia 0:33 0:27 0:38
Vigo 0:24 0:20 0:29
Villagarcía 0:35 0:27 0:42
 = signicant at 1% level;  = signicant
at 5% level;  = signicant at 10% level
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Table 5: Nonlinear system estimation
Parameter Specication 1 Specication 2 Specication 3
Demand equation
Constant 17:73
(39:41)
17:81
(25:97)
17:24
(23:56)
lti  0:93
( 18:26)
 0:93
( 17:87)
 0:92
( 17:77)
lt i 0:24
(4:28)
0:25
(3:53)
0:26
(3:74)
si 0:11

(3:46)
0:11
(2:97)
0:11
(3:20)
s i  0:16
( 4:89)
 0:17
( 3:77)
 0:14
( 3:14)
trend   0:0082
(0:15)
0:02
(2:03)
trend2      0:0014

( 2:24)
Individual
dummies
Included Included Included
First order condition equation
Conjectural
parameter
0:17
(2:36)
0:16
(1:85)
0:21
(1:81)
Lagrange
multiplier
0:50
(1262:99)
0:50
(1256:97)
0:50
(1447:79)
Number of observations 420
t-statistics for the parameter estimates in parenthesis ( = signicant at
1% level;  = signicant at 5% level; = signicant at 10% level)
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Conjectural variation or conduct parameter reects the intensity of non-price competi-
tion. We observe that the conjectural parameter is signicantly di¤erent from zero, so port
authorities take into account the capacity strategies of their rivals when they set their own
capacity. Thus, our results show that capacity competition exists but it does not seem too
much intense if we compare our result with those achieved by Kim and Vale (2001) and
Valverde and Guevara (2009) in bank industry.
Next, we check these results with a simulation. We assume an average port authority,
which current capacity is 849,199.3 square meters and moves an average of 14,389,150 tons
of cargo in period t; expands its capacity in 10,000 square meters, which implies increasing
its capacity by 1.177%. An expansion of 1.177% implies increasing demand by 0.129%, i.e.,
18,593 tons. On the other hand, this capacity expansion has a response in period t+1, rivals
increase their average capacity in 1,749.71 square meters (0.21%), which reduces demand
by 0.034% (4,874 tons, approximately). Hence, the expected net e¤ect on an average port
authoritys demand if it expands its capacity by 10,000 meters is an increase in its demand
by 0.095% (13,718 tons).
Once we have analyzed the e¤ect of capacity competition in port authoritiesdemand,
we ask what would happen whether this authorities instead competing, cooperating when
they set the extend of their facilities. We carry out a counterfactual analysis to estimate
the consequences of the conducts change. To model this, we have to change one of our
assumptions regarding the procedure of response of rival authorities. In this case, our
new assumption requires that authorities arrange to set the capacity and the variation in
capacities are in the same extend. So the new conjectural parameter is dened as follow:
' =
@s it
@sit
= 1 (17)
This fact changes the rst-order condition (13), which is transformed as follow:
@Mi0
@sit
=
@qit
@sit
+
@qit
@s it
@s it
@sit
  

tit
@qit
@sit
  @Cit
@qit
@qit
@sit

= 0 (18)
Thus, the econometric specication of equation 18 is:
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qit
sit
=  
4
qit
s it
3 (1   (tit   C 0it))
+
N 1X
i=1
i
3
di (19)
Then we estimate a new nonlinear equation system formed by equation 8 and 19. Table
6 shows the results of the counterfactual analysis using the same specications than table
5. In the rst specication we do not include technical change, in the second one we include
a lineal trend and nally, we include a quadratic trend. As we can see the coe¢ cients of
demand equation do not vary too much with respect those displayed in table 5, with the
exception of the parameters associated to the capacity. If we assume that port authori-
ties form alliances to set capacities, i.e., decide at the same time with their competitors
to change their capacity in the same extend, the cross-capacity elasticity decreases con-
siderably, so shippers demand of a given port became more inelastic to changes in rivals
facilities.
Now, using a simulation, we approximate the net e¤ect of capacity changes in a coopera-
tive framework. As we have done before, we take our average port authority which increases
its current capacity in 10,000 square meters, i.e. an increment by 1.177%. This increment
of capacity implies demand increases by 0.102% (14,637 tons) in a direct way. On the other
hand, the capacity of my rivals increases too in 10,000 which implies a reduction of my de-
mand by 0.035% (5,071 tons), so the net e¤ect of capacity changes on the cargo demand of
our average authority is an increment of 0.066% (9,566 tons). Comparing with competition
frame, gains of expansion are lower when competitors become allies, i.e., the incentives to
invest in capacity are reduced. These results should be interpreted with caution, as they lie
on restrictive and general assumptions, such as that all authorities which belong to the same
seafront joint the alliance or that the creation of an alliance implies set the same capacity
expansion for all their members.
8. CONCLUDING REMARKS
During the last decades, Spanish port legislators have tried to set the instruments to
promote competition among ports allowing higher exibility in making decisions about
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Table 6: Counterfactual analysis estimation
Parameter Specication 1 Specication 2 Specication 3
Demand equation
Constant 16:27
(52:51)
16:02
(45:94)
15:72
(42:74)
lti  0:88
( 17:38)
 0:93
( 17:71)
 0:92
( 17:61)
lt i 0:31
(5:52)
0:19
(2:73)
0:22
(3:21)
si 0:09

(2:71)
0:13
(3:68)
0:13
(3:81)
s i  0:03
( 2:21)
 0:04
( 2:71)
 0:04
( 2:73)
trend    0:01

( 2:98)
0:02
(1:75)
trend2      0:002

( 2:9)
Individual
dummies
Included Included Included
First order condition equation
Lagrange
multiplier
0:50
(1559:36)
0:50
(1462:64)
0:50
(1634:92)
Number of observations 420
t-statistics for the parameter estimates in parenthesis ( = signicant at
1% level;  = signicant at 5% level; = signicant at 10% level)
30
port charges or giving port authorities more autonomy to plan their investments. However,
reality seems to show that an e¤ective competition in charges has not been reached. This fact
has led port authorities to seek other ways to compete and attract new cargo tra¢ c, being
the capacity expansion a feasible competitive strategy. This has led to the overcapacity of
the system, because of tra¢ csgrowth has been lower than capacitys.
This study analyses the existence of non-price competition produced by information ex-
ternalities of conduct jointly with the e¤ectiveness of non-price strategies in increasing port
demand. Moreover, by a counterfactual analysis, we evaluate non-price strategies when
port authorities come into agreements about these strategies instead of competing.
For these purposes, we build a two-stage dynamic model. In the rst stage, Spanish port
authorities try to maximize their present and future cargo ows by setting their capacities
in a given period. In the second stage, shippers observe port charges and capacities, and,
in order to minimize their port-generalized cost, they chose the amount of cargo that pass
for each port authority. The main results show that both, port charges and capacity, a¤ect
shippersdecisions. Thus, we demonstrate that non-price strategies a¤ect port demand,
although in less extend than prices. Moreover, charges and capacities of closer ports also
a¤ect demand of a given port authority. Hence, capacity expansion of a given port a¤ect
its own demand and neighbors. On the other hand, we demonstrate that port authorities
react when they know that neighborscapacities have changed in the previous period. This
implies that informational externalities produce capacity competition in the Spanish port
system. However, we show that capacity competition is not too intense by carrying out a
numerical simulation. Finally, the net e¤ect of capacity strategies on demand is lower when
closer port authorities come into an agreement about setting their capacity.
Until now, there are not similar studies to our in port literature. This study is the rst one
that explicitly measure and evaluate port capacity competition using a new methodology
based in two di¤erent approaches. Other advantage of our model is that it tries to reect
as much as possible the Spanish port legislative context, but also it can be adapted to
other sectors and/or contexts. In our opinion, this study has important implications in
terms of transport policy. First, our structural model allows us to empirically estimate the
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e¤ect of port infrastructure investment on port tra¢ c generated and deviated. These are
key elements in a Cost Benet Analysis (CBA) that is used in many countries in order
to identify how to use scarce resources to obtain the greatest possible benets of them.in
transport policy. Second, the counterfactual analysis allows to evaluate the e¤ects of future
alliances or even mergers in the Spanish port industry, which were proposed in 2011, but
nally were rejected by the Ministry of Transport.
We are conscious about the limits of this research based in some restrictive assumptions
imposed in order to simplify our model or because the data available. However, this analysis
is a good starting point for future research in this topic.
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